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Abstract—Mixes, relaying routers that hide the relation be-
tween incoming and outgoing messages, are the main building
block of high-latency anonymous communication networks. A
number of so-called disclosure attacks have been proposed to
effectively de-anonymize traffic sent through these channels. Yet,
the dependence of their success on the system parameters is not
well-understood. We propose the Least Squares Disclosure Attack
(LSDA), in which user profiles are estimated by solving a least
squares problem. We show that LSDA is not only suitable for the
analysis of threshold mixes, but can be easily extended to attack
pool mixes. Furthermore, contrary to previous heuristic-based
attacks, our approach allows us to analytically derive expressions
that characterize the profiling error of LSDA with respect to
the system parameters. We empirically demonstrate that LSDA
recovers users’ profiles with greater accuracy than its statistical
predecessors and verify that our analysis closely predicts actual
performance.
Index Terms—anonymity, mixes, disclosure attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
COMMUNICATION confidentiality is traditionallyachieved through cryptographic means. This protection,
however, usually targets communication content and leaves
network information accessible to potential adversaries. These
traffic data, such as the identities of the participants in the
communication (e.g. IP addresses), their location, or the
amount and timing of data transferred, can be exploited by a
passive observer to infer sensitive private information about
the communication.
A well-known countermeasure against traffic analysis for
high-latency anonymous communications, i.e., communica-
tions that tolerate delay (e.g., e-mail), is the use of mix net-
works [1], [2], [3], [4]. Mixes prevent an observer from track-
ing communications by hiding the correspondence between
inputs and outputs [5]. However, it is known that persistent
and repeated communication patterns can be uncovered by
means of a disclosure attack [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13], [14], [15]. In short, these attacks infer Alice’s likely set
of contacts, also known as her user profile, by observing the
sets of possible receivers for each message Alice sends and
processing this information.
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The variants of the disclosure attack differ on the technique
used to infer user profiles from the observed communications.
Even though all of them have been proven effective at the time
of de-anonymization/profiling, their heuristic nature and/or
their complexity hinders the analysis of how system param-
eters influence their success. Furthermore, the great majority
of attacks have only been evaluated against simple threshold
mixes, where mixing occurs only between messages in a given
round, and only the Statistical Disclosure Attack has been
extended to attack pool mixes, in which messages can be
delayed for more than one round [9].
In this paper we propose a profiling approach based on
solving a least squares problem, the Least Squares Disclosure
Attack (LSDA). This approach ensures that the error between
the actual number of messages each user receives from the
mix and a prediction based on the messages sent to the mix
is minimized. We show that LSDA is an efficient estimator
when users’ behavior is static, i.e., the error incurred when
estimating the user profiles asymptotically tends to zero as the
number of observed mix rounds grows when user behavior
does not change within the observation window, and that it
is suitable to attack anonymous communication through both
threshold and pool mixes. In particular, in this paper we
consider threshold binomial pool mixes, in which messages
are individually selected to stay in the mix or to be sent to
their receiver according to a binomial distribution. We note,
however, that the choice of this mix is arbitrary and our
approach can be adapted to many other probabilistic mixing
strategies [16].
We provide two variants of LSDA: a very efficient un-
constrained profile estimator that outputs user profiles that
may contain negative probabilities (usually corresponding to
receivers that are not contacts of the target user) and a slower
constrained version that further minimizes the error by ensur-
ing that the output profiles are well-defined. We show through
simulations that the latter indeed minimizes the mean squared
error with respect to heuristic disclosure attack variants [7],
[9], [15] although it performs slightly worse than the Bayesian
approach [10] in the simple threshold mix scenario. In the
pool mix scenario, however, applying the Bayesian inference
techniques is computationally unfeasible and LSDA emerges
as the best option to infer the user’s behavior.
A remarkable feature of the least squares approach is that it
allows for the derivation of analytical expressions that describe
the evolution of the profiling error with the system parameters.
This is a key property, as it permits designers to choose system
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2parameters that provide a certain level of protection without
needing to run simulations. We empirically validate our results,
showing that our formulas reliably predict the evolution of
LSDA’s error as the parameters of the system change when
users’ behavior is static (i.e., time-invariant), and show the
usefulness of our methodology beyond this assumptions using
real data.
We note that previous works evaluated the attacks either
from mostly a de-anonymization of individual messages per-
spective (e.g., [10], [15]) or from the point of view of the
number of rounds necessary to identify a percentage of Alice’s
recipients (e.g., [13], [12], [14]). In this work we are interested
in the accuracy with which the adversary can infer the sender
profile of Alice, i.e., we not only seek to identify Alice’s
messages receivers, but also to estimate the probability that
Alice sends a message to them.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next
section we revisit previous work on disclosure attacks and
we describe our system and adversarial models in Sect. III.
We introduce the least squares approach to disclosure applied
to threshold mixes in Sect. IV, and extend it to account
for the pool mix in Sect. V. In both sections we derive
equations that characterize LSDA’s error with respect to the
system parameters which we validate in Sect. VI. We discuss
the limitations of our model and explain how to extend our
analysis to more realistic scenarios in Sect. VII, and we
conclude in Sect. VIII.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF DISCLOSURE ATTACKS
The first Disclosure Attack [6], [17] relies on graph theory
to uncover the recipient set of a target user Alice. It identifies
the set of Alice’s contacts by seeking mutually disjoint sets of
receivers among the recipient anonymity sets of the messages
sent by Alice. The main drawback of this approach is that it is
equivalent to solving a constraint satisfaction problem which
is well-known to be NP-complete.
The subfamily of Hitting Set Attacks [11], [14] speeds up
the search for Alice’s messages recipients by restricting the
search to unique minimal hitting sets. Pham et al. studied
the relationship between the number of observed rounds to
uniquely identify the set of receivers and the parameters of the
system [14]. This evaluation is similar to our work in spirit,
but it focuses on attacks that unambiguously identify recipient
sets while we deal with statistical attacks that only provide an
estimation of such sets as the ones discussed below.
The Statistical Disclosure Attack (SDA), originally pro-
posed by Danezis [9], and its sequels [8], [12], [13], es-
timate Alice’s sending profile by averaging the probability
distributions describing the recipient anonymity set [18] of
her messages. Mathewson and Dingledine improved Danezis’
SDA by extending it to a more general scenario and to more
complex mixing algorithms [12]. This improved version of the
attack is able to isolate Alice’s behavior by first estimating
the behavior of all the remaining users, employing those
observations where Alice has not participated.
Troncoso et al. proposed in [15] two attacks: the Perfect
Matching Disclosure Attack (PMDA) and the Normalized Sta-
tistical Disclosure Attack (NSDA). These attacks exploit the
fact that the relationship between sent and received messages
in a round must be one-to-one to improve the accuracy of the
estimated profiles. PMDA accounts for this interdependency
by searching for perfect matchings in the underlying bipartite
graph representing a mix round, while NSDA normalizes
the adjacency matrix representing this graph. The recipient
anonymity set of a message is built based on the result of this
assignment, instead of assigning uniform probabilities among
all recipients as SDA does.
Last, Danezis and Troncoso propose to use Bayesian sam-
pling techniques to co-infer users’ profiles and de-anonymize
messages [10]. The Bayesian approach outputs samples from
the distribution of all possible sending profiles, which in
turn allows to infer reliable error estimates. However, Vida
requires the adversary to repeatedly seek for perfect matchings,
increasing the computational requirements of the attack.
From all of the aforementioned attacks, only SDA has been
extended to take into account pool mixes. The fact that a mes-
sage can be delayed multiple rounds before being forwarded
to its recipient largely increases the set of possible receivers
of each message. This makes extending the Disclosure and
Hitting Set attacks [6], [11] a non trivial task and finding
correspondences between incoming and outgoing messages,
such as in PMDA, NSDA [15] and Vida [10], computationally
unfeasible. We will show that our least squares approach can
be adapted to the pool mix probabilistic behavior without
increasing significantly the computational resources needed.
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
In this section we describe our model of an anonymous
communication system and introduce the notation we use
throughout the paper, which we summarize in Table I. Capital
letters denote random variables and lowercase letters denote
realizations. Vectors are represented by boldface characters;
thus, x = [x1, · · · , xN ]T is a realization of random vector
X = [X1, · · · , XN ]T , where T denotes the transposing oper-
ation. Matrices are represented by boldface capital characters;
whether they contain random or specific values will be clear
from the context. We use 1N to denote the column vector
whose N elements are 1; similarly, 1N×M denotes the all-
ones matrix of size N ×M . Furthermore, < . > represents
the scalar product operation and ⊗ the Kronecker product.
1) System model: We study a system in which a population
of N users, designated by an index i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, exchange
messages through a high-latency anonymous communication
channel. We consider two types of mixes:
• Threshold Mix: This mix gathers t messages each round,
transforms them cryptographically, and outputs them in a
random order, hence hiding the correspondence between
incoming and outgoing messages.
• Binomial Threshold Pool Mix: This pool mix collects t
messages per round and alters their appearance to avoid
bitwise linkability. However, instead of outputting them
immediately, messages are placed in a pool and only leave
the mix with probability α. Otherwise, they stay and get
mixed with messages arriving in subsequent rounds.
We model the number of messages that user i sends in round
r as the random variable Xri , and denote as x
r
i the actual
3TABLE I: Summary of notation
Symbol Meaning
N Number of users in the population, denoted by i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
t Threshold of the threshold/pool mix
α Firing probability of the binomial pool mix
fi Probability that a message arriving to the mix comes from user i
pj,i Probability that user i sends a message to user j
qi Sender profile of user i, qi
.
= [p1,i, p2,i, · · · pN,i]T
pj Unnormalized receiver profile of user j, pj
.
= [pj,1, pj,2, · · · pj,N ]T
p Vector of transition probabilities, p .= [pT1 ,p
T
2 , · · · ,pTN ]T
µi 1−
∑N
j=1 p
2
j,i
µ¯
∑N
i=1 fiµi
ρ Number of rounds observed by the adversary
xri (y
r
j ) Number of messages that the ith (jth) user sends (receives) in round r
xr (yr) Column vector containing elements xri (y
r
j ), i, j = 1, · · · , N
yj Column vector containing elements yrj , r = 1, · · · , ρ
U ρ×N matrix containing all the input observations U .= [x1, · · · ,xρ]T
H IN ⊗U
y ρN × 1 column vector containing all the output observations y .= [yT1 , · · · ,yTN ]T
pˆj,i Adversary’s estimation of pj,i
qˆi Adversary’s estimation of user i’s sender profile qi
pˆj Adversary’s estimation of user j’s unnormalized receiver profile pj
pˆ Adversary’s estimation of transition probabilities vector p
number of messages user i sends in that round. Similarly, Y rj
is the random variable that models the number of messages
that user j receives in round r, and yrj the actual number
of messages user j receives in that round. Let xr and yr
denote column vectors that contain as elements the number
of messages sent or received by all users in round r, i.e.,
xr
.
= [xr1, · · · , xrN ]T , and yr .= [yr1, · · · , yrN ]T , respectively.
When it is clear from the context, the superscript r is dropped.
We also group the messages received by user j up to round
ρ in vector yj
.
= [y1j , · · · , yρj ]T . Let U denote the ρ × N
matrix containing all the input observations up to round ρ,
U
.
= [x1,x2, · · · ,xρ]T and let y denote the ρN × 1 vector
containing all the output observations up to round ρ, y .=
[y11 , · · · , yρ1 , y12 , · · · , yρ2 , · · · , y1N , · · · , yρN ]T . Lastly, we define
the matrix H .= IN ⊗U which we shall use when deriving
the LSDA estimator in Sect. IV.
Users in our population send messages to their recipients
according to two parameters:
• Sender profile: the sender profile of a user represents
her communication preferences, i.e., what fraction
of her messages is sent to each receiver. We
denote the sender profile of user i by vector
qi
.
= [p1,i, p2,i, · · · , pN,i]T , where pj,i models the
probability that user i sends a message to user j.
We define pj as the column vector containing the
probabilities of those incoming messages to the jth user,
i.e., pj
.
= [pj,1, pj,2, · · · , pj,N ]T . Let p be the vector
containing all the transition probabilities, i.e., p .=
[p1,1, · · · , p1,N , p2,1, · · · , p2,N , · · · , pN,1, · · · , pN,N ]T .
With the previous definitions, this vector can be written
as p = [pT1 ,p
T
2 , · · · ,pTN ]T . We make no assumptions
on the shape of users’ profiles (i.e., we impose no
restrictions on the number of contacts a user may have,
nor on how messages are distributed among them), other
than qi ∈ P , where P is the probability simplex in RN ,
i.e., P .=
{
r ∈ RN : ri ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 ri = 1
}
.
• Sending frequency: the sending frequencies model how
often users participate in the system. We denote the
sending frequency of user i by fi, where fi is the
probability that a message arriving to the mix comes
from user i. We make no assumptions on the values
of the sending frequencies other than 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N and ∑Ni=1 fi = 1.
Finally, we define µi
.
= 1−∑Nj=1 p2j,i and µ¯ .= ∑Ni=1 fiµi.
The former, µi, represents the uniformity of the distribution
of user i’s sender profile. It ranges from 0, when user i
always sends messages to the same user (i.e., pk,i = 1 for
a certain user k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, and pj,i = 0 otherwise),
to N−1N , when user i sends messages to all the other users
equiprobably (i.e., pj,i = 1N for j = 1, 2, · · · , N ). The
parameter µ¯ represents the average uniformity of all users’
sender profiles. These parameters shall come in handy in the
performance evaluation in Sect. VI.
2) Adversary model: We consider a global passive adver-
sary that observes the system during ρ rounds. She can observe
the identity of the senders and receivers that communicate
through the mix. Furthermore, she knows all the parameters
of the mix (e.g. t and/or α). As our objective is to illustrate
the impact of disclosure attacks on anonymity, we assume
that the cryptographic transformation performed by the mix
is perfect and thus the adversary cannot gain any information
from studying the content of the messages.
The adversary’s goal is to uncover communication patterns
from the observed flow of messages. Formally, given the
observations xri and y
r
j , for i, j = 1, · · · , N , and r = 1, · · · , ρ,
the adversary’s goal is to obtain estimates pˆj,i as close as
possible to the probabilities pj,i, which in turn allow her to
recover the users’ sender and receiver profiles.
A. Working hypotheses
For the derivation of the LSDA estimator in the next section,
we assume that users’ choice of recipients is independent for
4each input message, i.e., the recipient of each message sent by
a user i is chosen randomly according to its sender profile qi.
We also assume that the sender profiles are static, i.e., they do
not change within the same round or between different rounds.
For the analysis in Sect. IV-A2, we further assume that
the probability that a given message arriving to the mix
comes from a certain user is independent for each incoming
message, i.e., the number of messages sent by the users in each
round can be modeled as a multinomial distribution whose
parameters are the sending frequencies. Also, we consider that
the sending frequencies are static, i.e., they do not change
within the same rounds or between different rounds.
The implications of these assumptions not holding are
discussed in Sect. VII.
IV. A LEAST SQUARES APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE
ATTACKS ON THRESHOLD MIXES
We aim here at deriving a profiling algorithm to recover
the sending behavior of users anonymously communicating
through a threshold mix based on a least squares approach,
under the assumptions explained in Sect. III-A. Even though
the mix output random variables are conditioned on the input
matrix U (or, equivalently, H), for the sake of notational
simplicity, in this section we will not write such conditioning
explicitly.
Our goal is to estimate the users’ profiles given the input
and output observations, xri and y
r
j for i, j = 1, · · · , N , and
all rounds r = 1, · · · , ρ. To derive our estimator, we first note
that given the vector of probabilities p and the input samples
in U, the output process Y rj for j = 1, · · · , N can be modeled
in each round r ∈ {1, · · · , ρ} as the sum of N multinomials:
{Y r1 , · · · , Y rN} ∼
N∑
i=1
Multi (xri , {p1,i, · · · , pN,i}) . (1)
Recall that these output random variables Y rj , j =
1, · · · , N , r = 1, · · · , ρ are collected in random vector Y,
of which we observe one realization y. Given this realization
y and the input observations U, we want to estimate the
probability vector p. In order to do so, we look for the vector
p that minimizes the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between y
and Y. Then, our estimator can be formulated as the following
constrained least squares problem,
pˆ = arg min
qi∈P, i=1,··· ,N
E
{||y −Y(p)||2} (2)
where we have written Y(p) to stress the fact that the output
distribution actually depends on the probability vector p (cf.
(1)). Notice that the constraints are enforced on each sender
profile qi to ensure that they are well-defined. Since there
exists a one-to-one correspondence between each element in
qi for i = 1, · · · , N and each element in p, imposing the
restrictions over each qi is equivalent to doing so in p.
The estimator in (2) minimizes, on average, the squared
error over the possible outputs of the system, but does not
necessarily minimize the error in the estimation of p. The
estimator in (2) is actually biased, but expanding the formu-
lation we can find an unbiased and asymptotically efficient
estimator of p. First, let W(p) .= Y(p)−E{Y(p)}, which is
a vector containing zero-mean random variables and whose
variance is equal to that of Y(p). Using the definition in
(1), we can write E{Yj(pj)} = U · pj , and therefore,
E{Y(p)} = (IN ⊗U) p = H · p. Then,
E
{||y −Y(p)||2} = E{||y −Hp−W(p)||2}
= ||y −Hp||2 + E{||W(p)||2}(3)
where we have used that E {< (y −Hp),W(p) >} = 0
since E{W(p)} = 0.
Removing the term E
{||W(p)||2} from (3) leads to an es-
timator which is asymptotically efficient when users’ behavior
is static, in the sense that pˆ converges to the true profiles as
ρ→∞. In that case, (2) becomes
pˆ = arg min
qi∈P, i=1,··· ,N
||y −Hp||2 . (4)
A. Unconstrained Least Squares Estimation
We first propose an unconstrained estimator which is still
asymptotically efficient and amenable to an in-depth perfor-
mance analysis, as we will show in Sect. IV-A2. It is well-
known that, for the unconstrained case, the solution of (4) is
provided by the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse [19]:
pˆ = (HTH)−1HTy . (5)
At first sight, it might look that the matrix inversion needed
in (5) is formidable: the matrix HTH has size N2×N2. How-
ever, its block-diagonal structure allows for a more affordable
solution:
HTH = (IN ⊗U)T · IN ⊗U = IN ⊗ (UTU)
and, hence,
(HTH)−1 = IN ⊗ (UTU)−1
where UTU of size N ×N is assumed to have full rank.
The decoupling above allows us to write a more efficient
solution. The least squares estimate pˆj for the jth probability
vector can be written as
pˆj = (U
TU)−1UTyj , j = 1, · · · , N . (6)
Notice that, as a consequence of removing the constraints,
the obtained sender profiles are not guaranteed to lie in
the probability simplex P . In fact, some of the estimated
probabilities pˆj,i will often be negative, usually corresponding
to receivers j that are not contacts of user i.
Note that the matrix operations performed by LSDA have
much smaller computational requirements than the round-by-
round processing carried out by previous attacks [15], [10].
This decrease in computation comes at the cost of memory:
LSDA has to deal with large matrices. When memory is an
issue, the Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm [20], that
computes the least squares solution by processing the observed
rounds recursively, can reduce the requirements of the attack
considerably.
51) The Statistical Disclosure Attack as an LS estimator: We
now show that the original Statistical Disclosure Attack [7] in
fact corresponds to a particular case of the proposed LSDA
estimator. Here, the first user (Alice) is supposed to send only
one message to an unknown recipient chosen uniformly from
a set of nf contacts. The other users are assumed to send
messages to recipients chosen uniformly from the set of all
users. The target is to determine the set of contacts of Alice.
From these considerations, for a given round r where Alice
does send a message, we have that xr1 = 1 and
∑N
i=2 x
r
i =
(t − 1), and all the transition probabilities pj,i, for i ≥ 2,
j = 1, · · · , N , are known to be equal to 1/N . If we suppose
that in all rounds Alice transmits a message, we will have a
vector y which contains the ρ·N observations, q1 is unknown,
and all qi, i = 2, · · · , N are known. The unconstrained LSDA
estimator can be broken down into subproblems in which we
seek pj , for all j = 1, · · · , N , such that
||yj −Upj ||2 (7)
is minimized. Noticing that for each pj only pj,i is unknown,
we can write the equivalent problem of finding pj,1 such that
||yj −U′p′j − pj,1U1||2 (8)
is minimized, where U′ is obtained from U by deleting its
first column, itself denoted by U1, and where p′j is obtained
from pj after deleting its first element.
Then, the LS solution is
pˆj,1 = (U
T
1 U1)
−1UT1 (yj −U′p′j) . (9)
From the fact that U1 = 1ρ (as Alice sends one and only
one message per round), it follows that UT1 U1 = ρ. On the
other hand, all elements in p′j take the value 1/N and the
matrix U′ is such that the sum of the elements in each row is
(t− 1); therefore,
pˆj,1 =
1
ρ
ρ∑
r=1
yrj −
(t− 1)
N
, j = 1, · · · , N (10)
which coincides with Danezis’ SDA estimate [7].
The LSDA estimator differs from the original SDA estima-
tor in that it does not make any underlying assumption on the
transition probabilities and that it simultaneously solves for
the entire matrix of transition probabilities.
2) Performance analysis with respect to the system pa-
rameters: Next, we assess the performance of our uncon-
strained solution in (6) for the working hypothesis explained
in Sect. III-A. This will serve to understand the influence of
the system parameters on the knowledge that an adversary can
gain by applying our algorithm. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first in-depth analysis of how the system parameters
affect the performance of an attack on mixes. We aim at
deriving a theoretical expression for the MSE in the estimation
of the sender profile of user i, which we define as
MSEi
.
= E{||qi − qˆi||2} =
N∑
j=1
E
{
(pj,i − pˆj,i)2
}
. (11)
We carry out this derivation in Appendix A, obtaining
MSEi ≈ 1
ρ
{(
f−1i − 1
)(
1− 1
t
)
µ¯+
f−1i
t
· µi
}
. (12)
It is useful to interpret (12) in terms of the users’ sending
frequency fi and the profile uniformity µi. First, the error of
LSDA increases with f−1i , since it becomes harder to estimate
the behavior of a user when that user rarely participates in the
system. The MSEi also increases with µi and µ¯. This also
makes sense, since given a certain amount of observations it
is harder to infer the sending profiles when the behavior of the
users in the system is highly random (large µi or µ¯) than when
the users are more predictable (low µi or µ¯). The MSE also
decreases as 1/ρ with the number of rounds ρ; this implies that
the unconstrained LS estimator is asymptotically efficient as
ρ→∞. Even though this is somewhat to be expected, notice
that other estimators might not share this desirable property,
as we will experimentally confirm in Sect. VI.
Note that our expression for the theoretical MSE of LSDA
in (12) is an approximation due to the simplification (30) made
during its derivation in Appendix A. Therefore, there will be
a discrepancy between our MSE formula and the real MSE of
the LSDA estimator which increases with the number of users
in the system N and decreases with ρ.
To better understand the performance of the estimator, we
now derive a rough approximation of (12). Normally, when the
number of users is large, we can expect the sender frequencies
of the users to be low, i.e., f−1i  1. Also, if we assume that
users have many contacts without any specific preference to
any of them, then
∑N
j=1 p
2
j,i  1 or, equivalently, µi ≈ 1. In
this case, (12) can be approximated as
MSEi ≈ f
−1
i
ρ
. (13)
Although this is a rough approximation, it shows the dominant
parameters that affect the performance of the attack. Further-
more, it shall be useful when comparing the performance of
LSDA for threshold mixes with that of pool mixes.
B. Constrained Least Squares Estimation
We now derive an estimator for the constrained problem in
(4). Note that one could reduce the error of the unconstrained
estimator (6) by just setting the negative probabilities to
zero. The
∑
j pj,i = 1 constraint could be later ensured
by normalizing the profile, but this normalization has to be
performed without information and hence the estimation is
not guaranteed to be optimal.
We recall that the constraints are 0 ≤ pj,i ≤ 1, for all
i, j = 1, · · · , N , and ∑Nj=1 pj,i = 1, for all i = 1, · · · , N .
One might think of imposing such constraints to the decoupled
optimization problems (7) for each j. Unfortunately, while
the optimization is performed with respect to pj , each of the
previous sum constraints is given in terms of qi. Hence, if
those constraints are to be enforced, then the optimization
problems can no longer be decoupled.
An alternative solution consists in solving the problem in
an iterative fashion. If we define Pˆ = [qˆ1, qˆ2, · · · , qˆN ] and
6V
.
= [y1,y2, · · · ,yN ], then the unconstrained solution in (6)
can be written in a more compact form as
PˆT = (UTU)−1UTV . (14)
Using a gradient descent algorithm, it is possible to solve (14)
by iteratively updating matrix Pˆ as
Pˆnew = Pˆold − τ ·UT
(
U · Pˆold −V
)
. (15)
Here, the stepsize τ is chosen such that 0 < τ < 2/λmax,
where λmax is the largest eigenvalue of matrix UTU. The
constrained solution can be obtained by projecting each col-
umn of Pˆ onto the probability simplex P after each iteration.
This solution, which we will denote C-LSDA, outperforms the
unconstrained one as we will show in Sect. VI.
As a final remark, the constraints make a performance anal-
ysis similar to that in Section IV-A2 much more cumbersome.
The analysis of such solution is left as subject for future
research, but we note that the MSE for the unconstrained
version approximated in (12) constitutes an upper bound on
the MSE of the constrained variant.
V. A LEAST SQUARES APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE
ATTACKS ON POOL MIXES
In this section, we show how to extend the Least Squares
Disclosure Attack and the analysis of its performance to
the threshold binomial pool mix, which was described in
Sect. III, working under our hypotheses in Sect. III-A. We
note, however, that the principles behind the attack make it
easily adaptable to other mixing strategies (e.g., timed mixes),
as shown in [16]. The main difference of the pool mix with
respect to the threshold mix arises from the fact that some
messages stay in the pool so it is no longer possible for the
adversary to know how many messages from user i leave the
mix in round r.
In order to make the derivation of the estimator easier, we
abstract the threshold binomial pool mix as a combination
of a pool block followed by a mixing block, as depicted in
Fig. 1. The pool block stores messages until it has received
t of them, and then outputs each with probability α, leaving
the remaining for subsequent rounds. The messages that leave
the pool block traverse the mix block, which changes their
appearance and forwards them to their receivers. Note that the
pool mix always receives t messages each round, while the
number of messages that leave, denoted by ts in the figure,
is variable. To distinguish between the number of messages
from user i that enter and leave the pool block in round r,
we will respectively use xri and x
r
s,i, as shown in Fig. 1. The
adversary is only able to observe vectors xr and yr, while the
number of messages from each sender that leave the mix in
each round, modeled by the random vector Xrs, is unknown
to the attacker. We let UTs
.
= [X1s,X
2
s, · · · ,Xρs ].
We assume that at the time the adversary starts her observa-
tion the pool contains m messages whose sender is unknown.
Then, the messages in Xrs,i may come from two sources: the
initial m messages in the pool and the messages sent by user i
in the current or earlier rounds. We will use Nri to model the
number of messages from user i that were initially in the pool
xs,1
xs,2
xs,N
x1
x2
xN
y1
y2
yN
Pool Mix
t ts ts
Fig. 1: Abstract model of the pool mix, represented as a
combination of two blocks: the pool block, which delays the
messages, and the mix block, which operates as a standard
threshold mix.
and leave the mix in round r, and Xr,ks,i to model the number
of messages sent by user i in round k that leave the mix in
round r. Thus, the total number Xrs,i of messages from user
i that leave the mix in round r can be written as
Xrs,i =
r∑
k=1
Xr,ks,i +N
r
i (16)
where each of the contributions Xr,ks,i for k = 1, · · · , r
and Nri are independent. The random variables
{Xk,ks,i , Xk+1,ks,i , · · · , Xk+l,ks,i , · · · } can be modeled together
as a multinomial distribution with xki trials and probabilities
{α, α(1− α), · · · , α(1− α)l, · · · }.
We derive the LSDA estimator for the pool mix problem as
we did in Sect. IV for the threshold mix. Again, for notational
simplicity, we will not write the conditioning of Us and Y on
U. Given the vector of probabilities p and the messages that
leave the pool in each round Us, we can model the output
process as
{Y r1 , · · · , Y rN} ∼
N∑
i=1
Multi
(
xrs,i, {p1,i, · · · , pN,i}
)
. (17)
In this case, however, the values in xrs,i are not observable. To
derive our estimator following the approach in Sect. IV, we
need to compute the expected value of Y(p). In this case,
E{Yj(pj)} = E{E{Yj(pj)|Us}} = E{Us} · pj = Uˆs · pj
(18)
where each element of Uˆs
.
= E{Us} can be computed,
using (16), as
xˆrs,i = E{Xrs,i} =
r∑
k=1
E{Xr,ks,i }+ E{Nri }
=
r∑
k=1
xki α(1− α)r−k +mfˆiα(1− α)r−1 . (19)
Here, fˆi represents the adversary’s estimation of the probabil-
ity that each of the m messages in the initial pool corresponds
to user i. An attacker can estimate those values by observing
the system for a while. Anyhow, the influence of the initial
m messages in the estimation of the profiles diminishes
quickly as the number of rounds observed increases. For
implementation purposes, a more convenient way of writing
(19) is the following recursive equation
xˆr+1s,i = (1− α)xˆrs,i + αxr+1i , r = 1, · · · , N (20)
7where xˆ1s,i is initialized to x
1
i +mfˆi.
For compactness, we will find it useful to define the
following convolution matrix
B
.
=

α 0 0 · · · 0
α(1− α) α 0 · · · 0
α(1− α)2 α(1− α) α · · · 0
...
...
... · · · ...
α(1− α)ρ−1 α(1− α)ρ−2 α(1− α)ρ−3 · · · α

(21)
Then, we can write
Uˆs = B · (U + N0) (22)
where the matrix N0, which accounts for the average initial
state of the mix, is such that the i-th entry in the first row takes
the value mfˆi, while all the remaining elements are zero.
Our LSDA estimator in the pool mix, following the deriva-
tions given in the threshold mix scenario (4), can be formulated
as the following constrained problem:
pˆ = arg min
qi∈P, i=1,··· ,N
||y − Hˆsp||2 (23)
where Hˆs
.
= IN ⊗ Uˆs.
A. Unconstrained Least Squares Estimation on Pool Mixes
The solution for the unconstrained case is given by
pˆj = (Uˆ
T
s Uˆs)
−1UˆTs yj , j = 1, · · · , N (24)
where Uˆs = B · (U + N0). Notice that for the standard
threshold mix, which corresponds to α = 1, m = 0, we
have that B = Iρ, N0 = 0, so Uˆs = U, and both solutions
coincide.
1) Performance analysis with respect to the system param-
eters: The performance analysis of the LSDA estimator in the
pool mix for static user behavior is carried out in Appendix B,
where it is shown that
MSEi ≈ 1
ρ
{
(f−1i − 1)
[
µ¯
(
1
αr
− 1
t
)
+
(
1
αq
− 1
αr
)]
+
f−1i
t
· µi
}
(25)
where αq
.
=
α
2− α and αr
.
=
α(2− α)
2− α(2− α) . This approxima-
tion is asymptotically tight as ρ→∞. Moreover, when α = 1
we recover (12).
Comparing the MSE estimator in (25) with the threshold
mix one (12), we can conclude that the difficulty of learning
the profiles is always larger in the pool mix, since 1/αr ≥ 1
and (1/αq − 1/αr) ≥ 0. In the particular case that we have
analyzed for the threshold mix, where we have assumed that
f−1i  1 and µi ≈ 1, (25) can be approximated by
MSEi ≈ f
−1
i
ρ
· 2− α
α
. (26)
Comparing this approximation with (13) we can conclude that
the pool mix requires approximately (2 − α)/α times more
rounds to achieve the same MSE. Of course, this comes at the
TABLE II: System parameters used in the experiments.
Param Value
ρ {10000, 20 000, . . . , 100 000}
N {25, 50, 75,100, 200, 300, . . . , 1 000}
nf {10, 20,25, 30, 40, 50, · · · , 100}
fi {uniform(fi = 1/N), Zipf(fi = i−1/
∑N
k=1 fk)}
t {1, 2, 5,10, 20, 30, 40, 50}
α {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}
price of an increased delay; in fact, it can be shown that the
average delay for a message introduced by the pool, measured
in rounds, is (1− α)/α.
B. Constrained Least Squares Estimation on Pool Mixes
We remark that it is also possible to implement a constrained
version of the estimator in the pool mix which forces the
profiles to lie in the feasible set P by just replacing matrices
U by Uˆs in (15). As we will confirm in the evaluation section,
the constrained version outperforms the unconstrained one.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Experimental setup
We evaluate the effectiveness of LSDA against synthetic
anonymized traces created by a simulator written in the
Matlab language.1 We simulate a population of N users with
nf contacts each to whom they send messages following a
Zipf distribution. We have chosen the Zipf distribution as
a particular case of the power law probability distribution
often used to model social networks [21]. We note that both
the LSDA estimator and the theoretical approximation of its
performance (12) are not restricted to any specific shape of
sender profiles and therefore they would be applicable in any
other case (e.g., [22]). In our baseline experiment, users send
messages with the same frequency (fi = 1/N for all i) al-
though we also simulate the case where users do not participate
evenly in the system. For all the experiments in this section,
we keep the sender profiles and sending frequencies constant
between rounds, as assumed by our model in Sect. III-A.
In the first part of the evaluation, messages are anonymized
using a threshold mix with threshold t and in the second
part using a binomial pool mix where in each round t
messages arrive to the mix and each message in the pool has
a probability α of leaving the mix. We evaluate the results
for the case that the adversary observes ρ rounds of mixing.
Table II summarizes the values of the parameters used in our
experiments, where bold numbers indicate the parameters of
the baseline experiment.
We compare the effectiveness of the unconstrained (LSDA)
and constrained (C-LSDA) versions of our attack when pro-
filing users with respect to the following attacks:
• SDA-MD: we have implemented Mathewson and Din-
gledine’s version of the Statistical Disclosure Attack as
explained in [12] for the threshold mix. However, we
have found that the extension of the attack to the pool
mix in [12] returned incorrect profile estimations due to
1The code will be made available upon request.
8scaling issues in its formulation. We have corrected the
formula so it does estimate the profiles properly while
keeping the philosophy of the attack (we have used the
formula for SDA1 in [23] using matrix Uˆs instead of U).
• PMDA: the Perfect Matching Disclosure Attack, pro-
posed by Troncoso et al. in [15], estimates the users pro-
files in two steps: first, starting with an initial estimation
of the profiles (e.g., SDA), it computes the most probable
correspondence between input and output messages in
each round. Then, using that information, it builds a new
estimation of the profiles based on a weight parameter
z, which is z = 0.5 in [15]. We have implemented the
attack using z = 1, since we have observed that this
yields the best results. Note that, because of this, the
results of PMDA in this paper differ from those in [22].
• Vida: the Bayesian inference attack proposed by Danezis
and Troncoso in [10] allows to draw samples from the
distribution of the sender profiles given the observations.
We have fixed errors in the implementation of the algo-
rithm in [10], [22]. Also, in order to compare with the rest
of the attacks, we have decided to compute the average of
the samples obtained using the Bayesian inference attack,
since the MSE of this average profile is always lower than
the average MSE of the individual samples.
B. Performance metrics
We recall that the goal of the adversary is to estimate the
values pj,i with as much accuracy as possible. We define two
metrics to illustrate the profiling accuracy of the attacks. The
Mean Squared Error per sender profile (MSEi), previously
defined in (11), measures the squared error between the
estimated sender profile of user i, qˆi, and the real sender
profile qi. Secondly, the average Mean Squared Error per
transition probability measures the average squared error in
each transition probability pˆj,i,
MSEp
.
=
1
N2
N∑
i=1
MSEi =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E
{
(pj,i − pˆj,i)2
}
.
(27)
Both MSEs measure the amount by which the values output
by the attack differ from the actual value to be estimated. The
smaller the MSE, the better is the adversary’s estimation of
the users’ actual profiles.
For each of the studied set of parameters (ρ, N , µi, fi, t, α)
we record the sets of senders and receivers during ρ rounds
and compute the MSEp (or MSEi) for each of the attacks.
We repeat this process 100 times and plot the average of the
results in our figures.
C. Results: Threshold mix
We first study the effectiveness of LSDA in profiling mes-
sages anonymized using a threshold mix in different scenarios.
1) Performance with respect to the number of rounds ρ: As
we discuss in IV-A2, the number of observed rounds ρ has a
dominant role in the estimation error incurred by LSDA. We
plot in Fig. 2 the MSE per transition probability MSEp for
LSDA, C-LSDA, SDA-MD and PMDA.
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Fig. 2: MSEp evolution with the number of rounds in the
system ρ (N = 100, nf = 25, fi = 1/N , t = 10).
The constrained LSDA obtains the best results, although
the unconstrained variant and Mathewson and Dingledine’s
version of SDA follow up closely. These three estimators are
unbiased and asymptotically efficient, i.e., MSEp → 0 when
ρ → ∞. Furthermore, we can see how the approximation
in (12), represented by • in the figure, reliably describes the
decrease in the profile estimation error as more information
is made available to the adversary. On the other hand, PMDA
relies on an initial estimation of the profiles which, for N =
100, is far from reality. Therefore, even when the number of
rounds observed increases, PMDA is not able to improve as
effectively as the other attacks.
2) Performance with respect to the number of users N :
Next, we study the influence of the number of users in the
system on the estimation error. The results are shown in Fig. 3a
for ρ = 10 000 and Fig. 3b for ρ = 100 000. Note that we
have adjusted the vertical axis of Fig. 3b so that it is 10 times
smaller than that in Fig. 3a.
The MSEp of LSDA increases with N in Fig. 3a in a way
that it is not predicted by our estimation (12). This difference
is due to the approximation taken in (30) when deriving the
MSE formula and is reduced as the number of rounds observed
increases, as shown in Fig. 3b.
Both C-LSDA and PMDA improve their result as the
number of users increases. The initial estimation of PMDA
improves with N , which allows the attack to achieve better
results also when ρ grows (Fig. 3b). However, we note that
C-LSDA eventually outperforms PMDA when increasing only
N or ρ. On the one hand, the advantage PMDA gains by
increasing N does not improve constantly if ρ is kept fixed,
while the MSE of C-LSDA keeps decreasing with N . Also,
C-LSDA is asymptotically efficient while PMDA is not, which
means that C-LSDA will eventually outperform PMDA when
increasing ρ regardless of the number of users in the system.
3) Performance with respect to µ¯ and µi: In this section,
we first analyze the performance of the attacks with µ¯ by
increasing the number of friends nf assigned to all users in
steps of 10, as shown in Table II. In this experiment, µi = µ¯
for all i. The results are displayed in Fig. 4a. As we already
hinted in Sect. IV-A2, user profiles are harder to estimate in
LSDA (C-LSDA) when µ¯ is closer to 1, due to the sending
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(a) ρ = 10000
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(b) ρ = 100000
Fig. 3: MSEp evolution with the number of users in the system N (ρ = 10 000, 100 000, nf = 25, fi = 1/N , t = 10).
behavior of the users becoming more random. PMDA is able
to guess the correspondence between the input and output
messages more often when users focus their traffic on few
others, which happens at lower values of µ¯. The results of
SDA-MD, however, are almost independent of µ¯ and µi since
it groups the sending behavior of the users and thus is not able
to exploit the hubness of the traffic, as explained in [23].
Figure 4b shows the MSE per sender profile, MSEi, in a
scenario where the parameters µi are different for every user.
The same reasons outlined above explain the performance of
the attacks in this case.
4) Performance with respect to the sending frequencies fi:
So far, we have assumed that every user participates in the
system equally often. We now study what happens when this
is not the case. Figure 5 shows the MSEi in a scenario where
fi varies among users. As we have outlined in Sect. IV-A2,
the error in the estimation of a user’s profile is tied to the
participation of that user in the system. It is important to note
that, for users who rarely send messages, PMDA seems to
achieve better results than C-LSDA. This is because, for those
users, the one-to-one correspondence of the messages sent and
received in each round is very valuable information and LSDA
does not exploit it. Nevertheless, if more round observations
are available to the attacker, LSDA (C-LSDA) will eventually
outperform PMDA.
5) Performance with respect to the mix threshold t: By
observing (12) one can see that the threshold t of the mix has
little influence on the MSEp of LSDA, becoming negligible as
t 1. This is reflected by our experiments, shown in Fig. 6,
where the error of LSDA soon becomes stable as the threshold
of the mix grows. We must note that the time necessary to
observe ρ mixing rounds grows with the size of the threshold.
Hence, although the error is constant with t, increasing the
threshold delays the obtaining of accurate user profiles. Note
that this protection the mix offers when increasing t comes at
the cost of an increased delay in the communications.
As expected, increasing the threshold has a negative effect
on the other two attacks. The error in SDA-MD grows slightly
with t, since increasing this parameter decreases the number
of rounds where user i does not participate and this makes
harder to estimate the behavior of the messages not sent by
i. On the other hand, as the threshold grows the number of
plausible matchings increases and thus the likelihood that the
most probable matching is the real one decreases. This in turn
worsens PMDA’s performance significantly.
6) Comparison between attack principles: Throughout the
evaluation section we have studied three disclosure attacks
that estimate users’ profiles using statistics and optimiza-
tion techniques. We now compare these attacks to Vida, the
Bayesian inference-based machine learning algorithm pro-
posed by Danezis and Troncoso in [10]. For the sake of com-
parison, we also test the efficacy of simply setting the negative
probabilities output by the unconstrained LSDA and SDA-MD
to zero (denoted as Z-LSDA and Z-SDA-MD, respectively).
In order to illustrate the differences in computational load of
the attacks, we have measured their running-time, carrying
the experiment in a server with a Core2 Quad Q8300 2.5GHz
processor, 8GB of RAM and Matlab version 7.13.0.564 (64-
bit) on Ubuntu 12.04.3 LTS.
Figure 7 shows box plots representing the distribution
of the MSEp obtained after 20 repetitions of our baseline
experiment. We have already discussed that LSDA obtains an
advantage over SDA-MD by solving the problem for all users
simultaneously, but does not account for the one-to-one rela-
tionship between sent and received messages in the individual
rounds of mixing as PMDA does. Recall, however, that both
LSDA and SDA-MD outperform PMDA when the number of
rounds observed is sufficiently large. When not considering the
negative probabilities, both LSDA and SDA-MD improve their
performance. However, only LSDA can be formulated as a
constrained optimization problem (C-LSDA) and, when doing
so, it achieves results really close to Vida’s performance. This
improvement comes at an increase in the computational cost:
in this particular experiment, implementing LSDA as in (14)
and C-LSDA following (15), the latter was on average about
25 times slower than LSDA (in each realization, C-LSDA took
always less than 2 seconds to finish). The approach followed
in Vida improves the profile estimations considerably with
respect to the other attacks. While the effectiveness of Vida is
desirable, it comes at a huge computational cost because each
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Fig. 4: MSEp evolution with µ¯ in a scenario where µi is constant (a) and MSEi’s in an experiment where each user has a
different value of µi (b) (ρ = 10 000, N = 100, fi = 1/N , t = 10).
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Fig. 5: Evolution of the MSE per sender profile with the
sending frequency of the users fi (ρ = 10 000, N = 100,
nf = 25, t = 10).
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Fig. 6: MSEp evolution with the threshold t (ρ = 10 000,
N = 100, nf = 25, fi = 1/N ).
iteration of the algorithm requires finding a perfect matching
in all the ρ rounds observed. In this case, Vida was on average
280 000 times slower than LSDA (each realization took always
more than 4 hours to finish).
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Fig. 7: Comparison between attack principles in a threshold
mix (ρ = 10 000, N = 100, nf = 25, fi = 1/N , t = 10).
D. Results: Pool mix
We now proceed to evaluate LSDA’s profiling performance
when messages are anonymized using a threshold binomial
pool mix. We recall that, in a threshold binomial pool mix,
arriving messages are stored in a pool and leave the mix each
round (i.e., when t messages are received) with probability
α. Otherwise, messages stay in the pool until the next round,
when they are mixed with the arriving fresh messages and
again probabilistically selected to be fired or not. Additionally,
we compare LSDA with SDA-MD, the most effective attack
in the literature that has been applied to pool mixes, which
we have implemented as explained in Sect. VI-A.
In this case, we only analyze the performance of the attacks
with the firing probability α since, as we show in Appendix B
with (25), the behavior of LSDA in the pool mix with all the
other system parameters (i.e., ρ, N , µi, fi, t) does not change
with respect to the threshold mix case.
1) Performance with respect to the firing probability α:
Given the operation of the mix, the delay (in rounds) suffered
by messages traversing the mix follows a geometric distri-
bution with parameter α and hence its mean is (1 − α)/α.
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Fig. 8: MSEp evolution with the firing probability α (ρ =
10 000, N = 100, nf = 25, fi = 1/N , t = 10).
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Fig. 9: Comparison between attack principles in a pool mix
(ρ = 10 000, N = 100, nf = 25, fi = 1/N , t = 10, α = 0.5).
In Fig. 8, we illustrate the tradeoff between the profiling
accuracy of LSDA and α. As expected, small values of α
(i.e., large delays) result in larger error than when messages
abandon the mix very fast. The longer the delay, the more
messages participate in the mixing (the mean size of the pool is
t−αt
α ), and the more difficult it is to estimate relations between
senders and receivers. One can also see that the empirical error
closely follows the prediction given by (25).
The figure also shows the evolution of the MSE per transi-
tion probability MSEp of Mathewson and Dingledine’s SDA-
MD. When the firing probability is low, messages from users
are carried further to the next rounds. This, in time, reduces the
number of rounds that can be used to estimate the behavior of
all users but Alice (similarly to what happens when increasing
t), making the estimation of the profiles increasingly difficult.
2) Comparison between attack principles: We show, in
Fig. 9, box plots representing the distribution of the MSEp
for LSDA, C-LSDA, SDA-MD, Z-LSDA and Z-SDA-MD in
a pool mix with α = 0.5. These results emphasize that LSDA
(C-LSDA) is the attack which performs better in the pool mix.
VII. EXTENSIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE LEAST
SQUARES DISCLOSURE ATTACK
A. Real-world behavior
In a realistic scenario, the frequency with which users send
messages to the anonymous communication system, as well
as their choices of recipients (i.e., their sending profiles), are
likely to evolve over time. However, the analysis developed
in this paper assumes that profiles and sending frequencies
are static and hence it is only strictly applicable to observed
time windows in which users’ behavior does not change. As
the length of the window increases, users’ behavior evolution
causes a deviation of the adversary’s observation from these
assumptions, and the accuracy of the error prediction dimin-
ishes accordingly. We now discuss how our analysis can be
applied and extended to take into account behavior evolution,
and empirically evaluate the performance of the static and non-
static error estimation against real data.
Evolving behavior can be modeled by a stochastic process
describing the collection of random variables that represent
potential users’ profiles. Hence, the behavior leading to a
particular observation can be modeled by the random processes
{F ri } and {P rj,i} whose respective realizations {fri } and {prj,i}
represent the actual values of the sending frequencies and tran-
sition probabilities in each round. We note that such a model
can accommodate temporal changes of the profiles due to the
evolution of users’ individual preferences, as well as changes
due to interactions between users (e.g., replies to messages or
groups of receivers often contacted simultaneously).
In this scenario, LSDA can be used to estimate the average
value of the random process {P rj,i} representing the users’
average sending profiles in the observed period, i.e., the aver-
age proportion of messages sent in this period to each of the
possible recipients of the users. Notice that this corresponds to
a frequentist interpretation of the user profiles. In fact, it can
be shown that LSDA is an unbiased and efficient estimator
of the users’ average sending profile as long as the sending
profiles in each round prj,i can be modeled as a realization of
a wide-sense stationary process {P rj,i} [24].
Following the approach carried out in the Appendices for
the static case, it is possible to characterize the estimation
error for the case of time-varying profiles [24]. This analysis
reveals that time-varying profiles increase the variance of the
outputs given the input observations, which in turn slightly
increases the adversary’s estimation error. On the other hand,
time-varying sending frequencies increase the variance of the
input process, providing the attacker with a wider variety
of input observations than in the static case. This in turn
reduces LSDA’s MSE and allows the adversary to obtain better
estimates of the user profiles [24].
In order to show the usefulness of our methodology in
presence of real traffic, we evaluate the performance of our
error estimation analysis using the public Enron dataset.2 This
dataset consists of N = 294 senders from this database
(we have removed 11 users that send less than 20 messages
during the collection period), which send a total of 220 032
2http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼./enron/
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messages to 17 009 receivers. In this experiment, messages
are used as input to an anonymous channel implemented as a
threshold mix with threshold t = 10, obtaining 22 000 mixing
rounds. Note that, although the model in Sect. III assumes
that the number of senders and receivers is the same, it is
straightforward to extend the attack to the case where these
numbers do not coincide by redefining the sizes of the involved
vectors and matrices. Since we do not have access to the real
profiles and sending frequencies of the users that generated the
trace, for our experiments we compute the real probabilities
pj,i as the proportion of messages from user i sent to j in the
observed period, and the parameters fi as the fraction of all
incoming messages to the mix that were sent by user i.
We estimate the sender profiles of the users that participate
in the system using LSDA for ρ = {2 200, 4 400, . . . , 22 000}
rounds, and compute the MSE for each estimated transition
probability pˆj,i. We plot in Fig. 10 the average MSE per
transition probability (MSEp) of 100 users (thick straight line)
that send messages throughout the full observation period. The
figure also shows the theoretical estimation of the error using
(12) (dotted line), and using the error prediction for non-static
cases provided in [24] for the cases when sending frequencies
vary over time while profiles stay invariant (dashed lines), and
when profiles vary over time while sending frequencies remain
fixed (thin straight line).
As expected, real traffic does not behave according to
the assumptions made in the error estimation performance
analysis, and hence the results are less accurate than in the
simulations in Sect. VI. Yet, the predictor based on static
parameters is not far from the empirical result (the predicted
transition probabilities are off by at most 1.5 × 10−5), and
correctly follows the trend of the error as more information
is made available to the adversary. In fact, in [24] we show
that our formula in (12) practically gives an upper bound to
the empirical MSE when the number of users in the system is
relatively large. Therefore, the results provided in this paper
conversely serve as a lower bound to the privacy loss of mixes
as rounds of observations become available to the attacker,
even when users’ profiles and sending frequencies evolve with
time. This highlights the usefulness of the theoretical results
provided in this paper, pointing at a fundamental weakness of
existing mix-based anonymous communication systems. Such
results generalize the findings of Kesdogan et al [17], proving
that anonymity protection limits are caused by diversification
in user behavior rather than by the observation of changing
anonymity sets.
As a final remark, note that LSDA can be used to infer
how fast the sending behavior of the users evolves with
time. To this end, the adversary can split the observation in
shorter time windows (which may overlap) and use LSDA to
obtain the users’ average sending profile within each subset
of consecutive rounds of mixing. By varying the size of the
window the adversary can detect when the profiles change.
B. Adversarial prior knowledge
In some cases it might be possible that the adversary has
some prior information on the transition probabilities. While
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Fig. 10: Empirical and theoretical MSEp of LSDA against the
Enron dataset.
it is possible to modify the machine learning approach [10]
to account for this extra knowledge, this is non-trivial for
SDA or PMDA. In contrast, the least squares formulation can
be easily adapted to consider this additional information: if
the values of some probabilities are known, the attack can
be extended in a similar way as we did to show that the
original SDA is a particular, but largely suboptimal, instance
of LSDA. On the other hand, the prior knowledge may be
given as a set of constraints on the transition probabilities
(e.g., the adversary knows that user i contacts user j at least
half of the times). In that case, our iterative implementation
of C-LSDA in Sect. IV-B could be adapted to such scenario
by just projecting the solution onto the new set of constraints.
C. User and background cover traffic
Cover traffic, i.e., fake messages generated by the users
and/or the mix, makes harder for the attacker to infer the users’
sending profiles [25]. In this scenario, dummy messages can
be regarded as noise in the input and output observations. In
order to derive the LSDA estimator in this case, we would
look for the profiles which minimize the error between the
observed and the expected output, now considering that this
output consists of real and dummy messages and that the input
observations are noisy.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced the Least Squares Disclosure Attack,
which estimates user profiles by minimizing the prediction
error of the output given the input. By modeling the estimation
of profiles as a least squares problem, we are able to obtain
analytic results that predict the profiling error for a given set
of system parameters. This prediction is very accurate when
users’ behavior is static, and when this assumption does not
hold it gives a good approximation that correctly follows the
trend of the error as more information is made available. This
feature permits the designer of a high-latency anonymous com-
munication system to choose parameters that provide a desired
level of protection depending on the population characteristics
without the need to perform expensive simulations [10], [15].
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Under the hypotheses of static users’ behavior, we have
proven that, contrary to other approaches [15], this least
squares estimator is asymptotically efficient, meaning that if
the attacker is given enough observations of the system, the
error on the estimation of the user profiles will approach zero.
This finding generalizes previous results on the limits of the
protection of mix-based anonymous communication systems,
proving that such limits are imposed by varying user behavior
rather than changing anonymity sets.
Our experiments confirm that, in simple threshold mixes,
LSDA outperforms the state-of-the-art version of the Statis-
tical Disclosure Attack [12] and that a more sophisticated
implementation of LSDA gives results close to those of the
computationally expensive Bayesian inference approach [10]
at an affordable cost. Our attack is not limited to the analysis
of threshold mixes but can be easily extended to more complex
mixing strategies such as pool mixes [16]. In these complex
scenarios, the Bayesian approach is untractable and LSDA
yields the best results.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF MSEi FOR THE THRESHOLD MIX
Our goal is to derive an expression for the Mean Squared
Error per user, MSEi
.
=
∑N
j=1 E
{
(pj,i − pˆj,i)2
}
, when using
the LSDA estimator in (6) in a threshold mix scenario. To
this end, we first remark that the unconstrained least squares
estimate (6) is unbiased: it is straightforward to show that
E{pˆj} = pj by using the law of total expectation and
E
{
Yj |U
}
= U · pj :
E{pˆj} = E {E {pˆj |U}} = E
{(
UTU
)−1
UTE
{
Yj |U
}}
= E
{(
UTU
)−1
UTU · pj
}
= pj .
(28)
On the other hand, we can use the law of total variance
together with the fact that, from (28), Var{E{pˆj,i|U}} = 0
and Cov{E{pˆj,i|U},E{pˆj,k|U}} = 0 for k 6= i, to express
the covariance matrix of pj as
Σpj = E{Σpj |U} = E{(UTU)−1UTΣYj |UU(UTU)−1}
(29)
where ΣYj |U = E{(Yj−E
{
Yj |U})(Yj − E{Yj |U})T |U
}
.
We model {Xr1 , · · · , XrN} jointly as a multinomial distri-
bution with t trials and probabilities {f1, · · · , fN}. Also, we
note that Xri and X
s
k are independent when r 6= s. In order to
compute (29), we first point out that, since the input process
is stationary and memoryless, then using the Law of Large
Numbers we can write
lim
ρ→∞U
TU/ρ→ Rx (30)
where Rx is the autocorrelation matrix of the input process.
We can write this autocorrelation matrix, using
E{X2i } =
(
t2 − t) f2i + tfi (31)
E{XiXk} =
(
t2 − t) fifk for i 6= k (32)
as
Rx = t
[
ΛF + (t− 1) f · fT
]
(33)
where f .= [f1, · · · , fN ]T and ΛF .= diag{f}. Applying the
Sherman-Morrison formula [26], the inverse of this autocor-
relation matrix can be written as
R−1x =
1
t
[
ΛF
−1 −
(
1− 1
t
)
1N×N
]
. (34)
Assuming that the number of observed rounds ρ is large,
we can approximate (29) as
Σpj ≈
1
ρ2
R−1x E{UTΣYj |UU}R−1x . (35)
We now focus on the term E{UTΣYj |UU}. We model
Y rj |U as the sum of N binomial processes with xri trials and
probabilities pj,i, for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Note that Y rj and Y sj
are independent for r 6= s. Let sj,i .= pj,i · (1 − pj,i) and
Sj
.
= diag{sj,1, · · · , sj,N}. Then, ΣYj |U is a diagonal matrix
whose (r, r)-th element is(
ΣYj |U
)
r,r
=
N∑
i=1
xri sj,i . (36)
Operating, we get that the (m,n)-th element of
E{UTΣYj |UU} is(
E{UTΣYj |UU}
)
m,n
= ρ
N∑
i=1
sj,i · E{XiXmXn} (37)
and therefore we can write this term as
E{UTΣYj |UU} =
ρ
[
ΛF
(
ηjt
(3)1N×N + Sj1N×N t(2) + 1N×NSjt(2)
)
ΛF
]
+ ρ
[(
ηjt
(2)IN×N + tSj
)
ΛF
]
(38)
where ηj
.
=
∑N
i=1 fisj,i and t
(n) .= t · (t− 1) · · · (t− n+ 1).
Plugging (38) into (35) we get an approximation of Σpj .
Now, taking each of the diagonal elements of this matrix,
which are Var{pˆj,i} for i = 1, · · · , N and adding them along
j to obtain MSEi
.
=
∑N
j=1 Var{pˆj,i}, we finally get
MSEi ≈ 1
ρ
{(
f−1i − 1
)(
1− 1
t
)
µ¯+
f−1i
t
· µi
}
. (39)
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF MSEi FOR THE POOL MIX
We aim here at deriving an expression for the MSE in the
estimation of the sender profile of user i, previously defined as
MSEi
.
=
∑N
i=1 E{(pj,i − pˆj,i)2}, for the LSDA estimator in
the pool mix (24). To this end, we follow the same approach
as for the threshold mix. We will assume that N0 = 0, as the
impact of the initial conditions can be neglected for large ρ.
We start by showing that this estimator is unbiased. Follow-
ing (18), we can write E{Yj |U} = Uˆs · pj . Then,
E{pˆj} = E {E {pˆj |U}} = E
{(
UˆTs Uˆs
)−1
UˆTs E
{
Yj |U
}}
= E
{(
UˆTs Uˆs
)−1
UˆTs Uˆs · pj
}
= pj .
Using the law of total variance, we can now write
Σpj = E{(UˆTs Uˆs)−1UˆTs ΣYj |UUˆs(UˆTs Uˆs)−1} (40)
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where Uˆs = BU. As in the threshold mix case, we approxi-
mate (40), assuming that the number of observed rounds ρ is
large enough, as
Σpj ≈
1
ρ2
R−1xs E{UˆTs ΣYj |UUˆs}R−1xs . (41)
The (m,n)-th element of the autocorrelation matrix in the pool
mix case, Rxs, is
(Rxs)m,n =
1
ρ
ρ∑
k=1
k∑
r=1
k∑
s=1
E{XrmXsn}α2(1− α)2k−r−s .
(42)
In order to get an expression for this matrix, we can use (31)
and (32) since the distribution of the input process in the pool
mix is the same as in the threshold mix. If we assume that ρ
1/α, and define αq = α/(2−α), then we can approximate this
autocorrelation matrix by Rxs ≈ αqtΛF +
(
t2 − αqt
)
f · fT ,
whose inverse is
R−1xs ≈
1
ραqt
[
ΛF
−1 −
(
1− αq
t
)
1N×N
]
. (43)
We now focus on E{UˆTs ΣYj |UUˆs} in (41). In this case, the
random variables Y rj in different rounds are not independent
and therefore we cannot use the ΣYj |U that we derived for
the threshold mix scenario. Using the law of total variance, it
can be shown that
Var{Y rj |U} =
r∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
xki
(
pj,iα(1− α)r−k
−p2j,iα2(1− α)2(r−k)
)
Cov{Y rj , Y sj |U} = −
min(r,s)∑
k=1
N∑
i=1
xki p
2
j,iα
2(1− α)r+s−2k
(44)
which equals, in matricial form, to
ΣYj |U = diag{BUPj1N} −B · diag{UP2j1N} ·BT (45)
where Pj = diag{pj}.
The following steps are similar to those performed in
the threshold mix case and consist only of laborious matrix
multiplications. We omit the full description of these steps for
practicality issues and outline the remaining process: using
(45), we compute E{UˆTs ΣYj |UUˆs}. We multiply the resulting
matrix left and right by (43), and then take the diagonal
elements of the resulting matrix, which are an approximation
of Var{pˆj,i}. Adding these elements along j and defining
αr
.
= α(2− α)/(2− α(2− α)), we finally obtain
MSEi ≈ 1
ρ
{
(f−1i − 1)
[
µ¯
(
1
αr
− 1
t
)
+
(
1
αq
− 1
αr
)]
+
f−1i
t
· µi
}
(46)
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